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ABSTRACT 
ASSESSMENT OF FLOOD PROTECTION STRATEGIES FOR COMBINED 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURE AND HURRICANE/STORM SURGE 
EVENTS IN THE MEADOWLANDS AREA 
 
by 
Nisharg Dipakkumar Dalwadi 
As a result of a wide-reaching comprehensive post-Sandy NJIT project entitled "Flood 
Mitigation Engineering Resource Center (FMERC)", a detailed investigation of 
alternative measures for flood mitigation in the Meadowlands area was completed in June 
2014. The project involved the assessment of flood impacts, and the evaluation of a range 
of structural and non-structural capital improvement measures, maintenance, operations 
and regulatory measures, and broad system design and redundancy measures. 
 The basic objective of this thesis is to develop an innovative procedure for the 
enumeration and simulation of probability-weighted combined events, e.g., Oradell dam 
failure under various scenarios (sunny day, water level, etc.) along with a super storm 
event at various time staging levels. The approach broadens the analytical arsenal 
available to policy-makers for the purpose of comprehensive risk and resiliency analysis 
and the selection of optimal protection alternatives. The methodology includes data 
analysis done with the help of software like Arc GIS and Hazuz MH. Using GIS 
simulations, the FMERC proposed solutions e.g., Arc wall are simulated under combined 
event scenarios in order to identify possible modifications or adjustments for maximum 
risk reduction. An outcome of this research is the development of an empirical approach 
for simulating combined events and adaptation strategies derived to provide a more 
comprehensive level of protection. 
ASSESSMENT OF FLOOD PROTECTION STRATEGIES FOR COMBINED 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURE AND HURRICANE/STORM SURGE 
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1.1 Introduction to Critical Infrastructure (Dams) 
Critical infrastructure is defined by “The American Heritage Dictionary” as “The basic 
facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or 
society, such as transportation and communications systems, water and power lines, and 
public institutions including schools, post offices, and prisons.”  (The American Heritage 
Dictionary, 2014) 
Infrastructure in the United States is becoming more prone to failure as the 
average age of structures increase. Infrastructure is owned and managed by both the 
public and private sector, and includes a number of structures that improve living 
conditions and commerce, including schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, dams, sewers, and 
energy systems. For some types of infrastructure, such as dams, the age of a structure is a 
leading indicator of the potential for the failure of the structure, and the average age of 
infrastructure in the United States is rising.  (Dalton, 2009) 
Between 2000 and 2009, the average age of government and privately-owned 
structures (excluding housing) increased by about one year. For government structures, 
the trend was even more pronounced over the long term—United States structures’ 
average age rose from 18 years in 1970 to 25 in 2009, indicating that structures are being 





There are several examples of infrastructure becoming more prone to failure as it 
ages. The number of dams rated as deficient—or those with structure or hydraulic 
deficiencies leaving them susceptible to failure—tripled between 1999 and 2008. Over a 
third of the Nation’s dams are 50 years old, a number that will increase to nearly 70 
percent in 10 years.  (Associations of state dam safety officicals, 2009) 
The average age of the 84,000 dams in the country is 52 years old. The nation’s 
dams are aging and the number of high-hazard dams is on the rise. In the sace high 
hazard dam is defined as anticipated loss of life in the case of failure. Low Hazard dam is 
defined as anticipated loss of the dam or damage to the flood plain, but no expected loss 
od life. Many of these dams were built as low-hazard dams protecting undeveloped 
agricultural land. However, with an increasing population and greater development below 
dams, the overall number of high-hazard dams continues to increase, to nearly 14,000 in 
2012. The number of deficient dams is estimated at more than 4,000, which includes 
2,000 deficient high-hazard dams. The Association of State Dam Safety Officials 
estimates that it will require an investment of $21 billion to repair these aging, yet 
critical, high-hazard dams.  (ASCE, 2014) 
No one knows precisely how many dam failures have occurred in the U.S., but 
they have been documented in every state. From Jan. 1, 2005 through June 2013, state 
dam safety programs reported 173 dam failures and 587 "incidents" - episodes that, 
without intervention, would likely have resulted in dam failure. (ASCE, 2014) 
The map below is based on a (non-comprehensive) list of dam and levee failures 




demonstrates that dam failures are not particularly common but they do continue to 
occur. Locations are approximate. 
The large red dot on the Gulf Coast represents the New Orleans levee failures 
resulting from Hurricane Katrina. A few other levee failures are included such as all of 
those indicated in Northern California. If levee failures from the 1993 floods were 




Figure 1.1 USA dam failures.  





1.2 Background: The New Jersey Meadowlands and Flood Issues During Hurricane 
Sandy 
 
Super storm Sandy’s widespread impact was felt across the entire Atlantic coastline of 
the United States. Though it was a Category-3 storm at its peak intensity when it made 
landfall in Cuba, it was a Category-2 storm off the coast of the Northeastern United 
States. NOAA estimated that more than 60 million people across 24 states of the USA 
were affected by Sandy. More than 20,000 flights were cancelled during the six day 
stretch after the landfall of this deadly storm (Mutzabaugh, B. 2012). 
The study area for the thesis is focused in the New Jersey Meadowlands, which is 
located in the North-Eastern corner of New Jersey and is part of the New York City 
Metropolitan Area. Bergen County which is partially located in the Meadowlands, is 
divided into a total of 70 townships and boroughs. The Meadowlands area has seen in 
history, a sudden population shift to the Northeast New Jersey boarders, upon the starting 
of number of transportation projects between New Jersey and New York. As a result, 
some of the towns including Little Ferry and Moonachie saw extensive population 
growth and sprawl development. As a result of sudden population growth, there was a 
push towards development of the low lying areas. However, their infrastructure planning 
did not match the wide expansion and sprawl development, and thus, the region is now 
facing elevated runoff levels which are impacting urban streams, enlarging the stream 
channels, increasing sediment and pollutant loads, and degrading stream habitat. Such 
lack of infrastructure planning and maintenance of existing drainage were the major 
influences in elevating the damage caused by Tropical Storm Sandy. 
The report by New Jersey Department of Community Affairs/Community 




located in Bergen County had sustained “severe” or “major” damage due to Sandy. The 
entire town of Moonachie (census tract id 34003036200) and part of Little Ferry (census 
tract id 34003029200) had more than 50% of households with severe or major damage. 
The other census tract of Little Ferry (34003029100) had between 10% and 24% of 
households experience such damage. 
 
1.3 Oradell Dam 
The Oradell Dam is a 22-foot high concrete dam located on the Hackensack River in 
Bergen County, New Jersey. The Oradell dam was built in 1901 by the dredging of a mill 
pond. In 1911 the mill pond was replaced by a timber-crib dam to increase storage. The 
construction of a 22-foot high concrete gravity dam to further increase storage began in 
1921 and was completed in 1923. 
The Oradell Reservoir has a normal storage volume of 10,740 acre-feet at 
elevation 22.2 ft NAVD 88. The surface area at normal storage is 796 acres. Maximum 
storage volume is 13,316 acre-feet at elevation 24.68 ft, which is also the crest elevation 
of the dam. The hydraulic height of the dam is 25 ft. The reservoir provides drinking 
water to a population of about 750,000 living in Bergen and Hudson counties. 
 
 1.4 Subject Selection 
The Flood Mitigation Engineering Resource Centre (FMERC) has submitted a report to 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. The report has done a detailed 
investigation of alternative measures for flood mitigation in the Hackensack/Moonachie 




assessment of the flood impacts, and evaluation of a range of capital improvements, 
maintenance and operations and regulatory measures, including structural and non-
structural engineering alternatives, regulatory and system design and redundancy 
measures. The evaluation included hydraulic modelling, environmental, risk and socio-
economic impacts, including estimated capital and maintenance and operating costs of 
mitigation and protection alternatives.  
The report has also considered the scenario of a combined event of Sandy and the 
Oradell Dam break occurring during same time frame. There is some probability of the 
Oradell Dam failing during a super storm. The thesis examines the impact of the Oradell 
Dam failure during a storm surge event such as Hurricane Sandy (2012). The objective is 
to generate a range of protection alternatives and simulate the protection level under a 
variety of combined events. 
The FMERC project work for Sandy has already performed various simulations 
for individual dam breach as well as Sandy shown in Appendix E of the report. The 
Decision Support System for Water Infrastructural Security (DSS – Wise) software is 
used for the simulation. There are three types of simulations done in this report. The 
simulations are a sunny day Oradell Dam failure; a sunny day storm event; and a dam 
break during a super storm event (the combined event). Detailed enumerations and 
simulations were done for these extreme events. The combined event was not simulated 
with the actual proposals e.g., Arc Wall. The proposals like Arc Wall, were not simulated 
in a combined event case. There is an attempt made to give a fresh look to the proposed 




to the proposed solution by the FMERC team, which will be value addition to the work 
done by the FMERC team. 
 
1.5 Objectives 
The basic objective of this thesis is to enumerate and simulate combined events, e.g., 
Oradell Dam failure under various scenarios (sunny day, sea level rise, etc.) along with a 
super storm event, for the purpose of risk analysis and evaluation of protection 
alternatives. The central theme is to generate a range of protection alternatives and 
simulate the protection level under the variety of combined events (Oradell Dam failure 
during super storm event). 
The added goals are as follows. The attempt will be made to estimate the risk and 
joint probabilities of the combined event.  The alternatives proposed in the FMERC 
report will be simulated for the combined event with the help of the FMERC team. 
According to the report there is about 1773.9 Acres of land area in the Meadowlands, 
which is not flooded by Sandy alone, but would be flooded due to the combined event. 
Such areas will be the identified in the process. An attempt will be made to modify the 
current proposed solutions to make the proposals more effective in the combined event. 
In the combined event of Super storm and dam breach and the cost benefit ratio 





1.6 Research Question to be Explored 
The main research questions to be answered is as follows. 
 What will happen if the critical infrastructure fails to perform its duty during a 
hurricane of Sandy magnitude acting alone? 
 
1.6.1. Sub Research Question 
The sub research questions for the thesis are as follows.  
 Which areas will be affected most due to the combined event?  
 What will be the quantifiable property damages and other damages? 
 How to modify the currnet solutions in the FMERC report (Arc Wall) to take care 




The Geographical Scope is the Meadowlands Area, New Jersey, USA. The research is 
based upon a hypothetical Oradell Dam break (A critical infrastructure failure) during 
storm surge event like sandy. An attempt is be made to collect and simulate the data 








2.1 Global and National Scenario of Natural Disasters 
The world has been warming up significantly over the past few decades, and this change 
in climate towards a warmer environment is causing an increased number of natural 
disasters which, in the recent past, have caused immense social and economic damage 
across the globe.  (Karl,2010) 
 
Figure 2.1 Natural catastrophes in the USA 1980 – 2012. 
Source: (International Disaster database, 2012). 
 
The Figure 2.1 shows the number of catastrophes in the USA since 1980. The 
major part of the events are due meteorological events like storms. In 2012, about 66% of 
all catastrophic events are storms. Tropical storms and hurricanes, in particular, develop 




catastrophic events. Any such catastrophic disaster weakens the affected community’s 
ability to cope with the next disaster, unless mitigation measures are implemented and 
resilience is built into the systems. 
Every year various types of small and large scale natural disasters affect the USA 
and threaten the country’s lives, livelihoods and economy. Between 1900 and 2013, more 
than 865 natural disasters have affected in the USA causing about $734 billion of damage 
out of which about $538 billion damage occurred between the year 2000 and 2013. 
Contribution from Hurricanes, Storms and Flood disasters is about $626 billion.  
(International Disaster database, 2012) 
The major breakdown shows more than 65 % of catastrpohic events in the USA is 
based upon storms. Figure 2.2 shows the economical loss due to the top ten natural 
disasters in the history of United States.  (NOAA, 2013) 
 
Figure 2.2 Economic loss due to natural disasters. 




2.2 Impact of Hurricane Sandy 
Hurricane Sandy did a lot of damage throughout its path. It was the second most costly 
storm in the history of United States. Preliminary U.S. damage estimates are near $50 
billion, making Sandy the second-costliest cyclone to hit the United States since 1900 
(Blake et al.).   
Figure 2.3 shows devastation in the wake of Hurricane Sandy has brought to 
attention the vulnerability of the entire east coast and some inland areas putting a large 
population in coastal regions at great risk. The increase in frequency of high magnitude 
storm events such as Irene and Sandy has brought to attention the need for long term and 













Figure 2.3 Devastation of Hurricane Sandy. 




Half the city of Hoboken was flooded and in excess of 50,000 people were 
evacuated.  A 50-foot piece of the Atlantic City Boardwalk washed away, and the 
National Guard was mobilized to assist throughout the state.  Up to 5 feet of water were 
observed in the streets of Moonachie and Little Ferry as the towns were devastated by the 
flood of water. More than 2.6 million customers were without power for several days, 
and at least 37 people were killed. All this resulted in estimated damages close to $30 
billion. 
The FEMA Coastal Analysis and Mapping Division have made available 
Hurricane Sandy Advisory Base Flood Elevations (ABFEs) Interactive Maps in New 
Jersey and New York. This is a very useful tool in tracking the extent at which the storm 
affected different areas in the two states. The website also offers a lot of information on 
how to prepare for storms and steps to follow in case of emergency or voluntary 
evacuation. The impact of Sandy on the municipalities of Moonachie, Little Ferry and 
Hackensack was devastating as was the situation for much of New Jersey.  
The director of the Meadowlands Environmental Research Institute (MERI) 
called Sandy a 750 year storm event.  For Moonachie and Little Ferry in particular, the 
streets were filled with (up to) five feet of water within a 30 minute period.  The residents 
needed the help of emergency personnel to rescue them from their homes.  Newspaper 
accounts indicated that as the result of Sandy, a 13 foot surge from the ocean, at Newark 
Bay, generated flooding conditions in the Hackensack River.  This caused overtopping of 
the levees, which were designed to protect the community. 
The damage caused by Hurricane Sandy on houses and businesses along the 




damaged from these two forces, and all floor panels were pulled off the supporting beams 
and piles as these structures do not have any protecting structures against these forces.  
Hurricane Sandy forced the release of over 10 billion gallons of raw and partially treated 
sewage (90%+ of which went into waters in and around New Jersey and New York) 
causing significant contamination problems never before seen in the past. A lot of 
environmental contamination also took place along with flooding. 
 
2.3 Flood Mitigation Engineering Resource Centre Proposal (At NJIT) 
As a result of a wide-reaching comprehensive post-Sandy project sponsored by the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and the Governor’s Office for 
Reconstruction and Recovery, the Flood Mitigation Engineering Resource Center 
(FMERC) at NJIT completed a detailed investigation of alternative measures for flood 
mitigation in the Meadowlands area in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Sandy. The 
project involved the assessment of flood impacts, and the evaluation of a range of 
structural and non-structural capital improvement measures, maintenance, operations and 
regulatory measures, and broad system design and redundancy measures. 
The outcome of the project was quite significant. There were three major areas in 
which solutions were given by the FMERC team. The major sections were as follows: 
 Structural flood protective alternatives. 
 Non structural mitigation alternatives. 




The NJIT - FMERC Team listed the Arc Wall as a recommended medium term 
solution. At an initial capital cost estimated at $180 million, it achieves the highest 
benefit-cost ratio and effectively protects the low-lying areas of the study area and 
surrounding communities with mixed residential and industrial bases. The Arc Wall is the 
least risky with regard to the uncertainty in the exposure to sea level rise due to global 
warming. It is able to provide storm surge protection under a high sea level rise scenario 
of 37.6 inches. Figure 2.4 shows the conceptual alignment of the Arc Wall. 
Figure 2.4 Conceptual alignment of the Arc Wall. 
Source: (FMERC, 20130. 
The report has also considered the probability of the Oradell Dam break and the 
hurricane sandy as a combined event. Oradell Dam is a critical infrastructure asset, whose 
failure during a storm surge event such as Super Storm Sandy (2012) may exacerbate 
flooding and lead to additional loss-of-life and property damage. The hypothetical failure of 




consequences in terms of increase of flood extent and flooding depths.  (Flood Mitigation 
Engineering Resource Center, 2014) 
The basic objective of this thesis is to develop an innovative procedure for the 
enumeration and simulation of probability-weighted combined events, e.g., Oradell dam 
failure under various scenarios (sunny day, sea level rise, etc.) along with a super storm 
event at various time staging levels. The approach broadens the analytical arsenal 
available to policy-makers for the purpose of comprehensive risk and resiliency analysis 





DATA COLLECTION, PROCESS OF ANALYSIS AND TOOLS 
 
Chapter 3 describes the process of data collection, data analysis and tools used to analyze 
the condition. 
 
3.1 Data Collection 
The data collection for the thesis is basically secondary data collection. From the FMERC 
team report a lot of data is considered for this study. The FMERC team report Appendix 
C and Appendix E are the basic data sources. Data collection includes the following 
information. 
 Collection of base Maps 
The simulations available with the FMERC team are divided in to three portions. 
1. Only Sandy – Simulations  
2. Simulations for only Oradell dam breach on a sunny day 
3. Combined event scenario – 3.00 hours after Sandy, the Oradell Dam breach 
There are several agencies included in the process of preparing the mitigation plan 
herein. The data collection for base layer is done via email sharing with the agencies as 
well as data mining from the available resources at NJIT. 
Identifying the software and data requirement for this research involves a clear 
understanding of the scope and approach and research on availability of state of the art 
software for assessing and analyzing the impact of flooding on a community. Data was 




http://www.usgs.gov/ , https://njgin.state.nj.us/. The base data layers are also downloaded 
from a lot of other governmental and municipality level websites referenced in the 
Appendix.   
Topographic data - LiDAR was required for the flood inundation study. These 
datasets were georeferenced appropriately for the project. The data was collected from 
the FMERC team data  base. 
 Super Storm Sandy related other data 
The data collection for damage estimates and literature review is done by secondary data 
analysis. Available published papers from recognized publishers as well as governmental 
agencies were utilized. FEMA published documents on websites as well as paper 
publications were also referred. Data extraction was done by data mining and appropriate 
data was considered for the analysis work. 
 
3.2 Process of Analysis 
The analysis process is highly depended upon the Arc-GIS calculations and other tolls 
available which work with Arc-GIS extensions. The analysis is also done with several 
steps. The steps are described as follows. 
3.2.1 Establishing Importance of a Dam Break Event 
A dam break event is important for making a complete flood protection scenario. A dam 
breach even on sunny day can cause a lot of damage to the region. With the help of the 
available dam breach analysis, cost and benefit analysis of Arc wall was calculated with 
the Hazus extension of Arc-GIS. Analysis phase includes compilation and transformation 




from various sources in order to ensure a homogeneous database which was the base for 
any further analysis, simulation of inundation. 
3.2.2 Calculation of Peak Scenario Timings 
There are numerus possibilities with the combined event. A dam breach and Sandy can 
happen with varying timing scenarios. The worst scenario would happen when Sandy as 
well as the dam breach inundation are peak in the region. The back calculation of time is 
really important to understand the probabilities of the worst case scenario. With the 
available data, peak timings are calculated for the event. It is elaborated in the Chapter 4. 
3.2.3 Analyzing the Arc Wall Proposed with the Worst Case Condition 
The best possible outcome for the selected region is Arc wall according to NJIT proposal. 
The efficiency of arc wall is cross checked with the different sea level rise and the flood 
inundation in-front of the Arc wall.  
3.2.4 Proposing Modifications of the Arc Wall 
The FMERC team allows to slight modifications to fine tune the location in the report. A 
genuine effort is made to fine-tune the arc wall to protect more possible dense areas 
located near arc wall.  
3.2.5 Benefit Cost Analysis 
Benefit cost analysis was done for the proposed structural alternatives. The cost 
component of this ratio represents the Net Present Value (NPV) of the construction and 
maintenance and repair cost of the mitigation measures and the benefit component 





3.3 Tools used for Analysis 
In this section of the thesis, tools used for the analysis purpose is described. There are lot 
of Arc-GIS based tools used for the analysis purpose. The major tools used are as 
follows. 
3.3.1 Arc-GIS 
Esri’s ArcGIS, was used to build the geodatabase, analyze the regions of interest, and 
learn analysis and execution of various scenarios. It was also used to delineate some of 
the existing and all of the proposed flood mitigation structures for further analysis. Since 
Hazus-MH is currently not compatible with any later versions of Arc-GIS, version 10.0 
with Service Pack 1 (SP1) was used for this research. A portion of time calculations and 
basic work was done by Arc-GIS 9.2. Following components of Arc-GIS were 
extensively used: 
 Arc-Map: It is used primarily to view, add and analyze various existing ArcGIS 
compatible data and shape files required for the project and to create/manipulate 
data required for the thesis. 
 Arc-Catalog: It is used for data administration or management application which 
allows the users to view geodatabase, files, metadata and other data sources. 
 Arc-Toolbox: It is a collection of toolsets and tools used for geoprocessing e.g., 
clipping data, conversion of data, import/export of data, etc. (ESRI - Arc-GIS) 
3.3.2 Hazus – MH 
Hazus-MH (Multi Hazard) is FEMA’s nationally applicable non- proprietary software 
program that estimates potential building and infrastructure losses from floods, 




in response to the need for more effective national, state, and community-level planning 
and the need to identify areas that face the highest risk and potential for loss. Later, it was 
expanded into a multi-hazard methodology and included models for estimating potential 
losses from wind (hurricanes) and flood (riverine and coastal) hazards. 
The loss estimation model of Hazus-MH reflects state-of-the-art scientific and 
engineering knowledge and assist in informed decision-making by providing a reasonable 
basis for developing mitigation measures, emergency preparedness, and response and 
recovery plans and policies. Though the basic default data is same for all three types of 
hazards, some attributes are more critical to one model than others due to the unique 
nature of each hazard type. Thus, based on the type of disaster under investigation, users 
need to select appropriate model and ensure the accuracy of the data that is more critical 
to that model. The default Hazus-MH data can be supplemented with local data to 
provide a more refined analysis. 
Hazus-MH uses GIS technology to graphically map and display hazard data, the 
results of damage and economic loss analyses, and potential effects on area populations. 
Users have the ability to either query and map the inventory and loss estimation or use 
the in-built loss estimation summary reports. Crystal reporting is used to generate the 
summary reports. Although Hazus-MH itself is free, it requires the users to have ArcGIS 
with ArcView license level. In addition, ArcGIS Spatial Analyst extension is required for 
Flood Model. 
Out of the three currently available models, the Hazus-MH flood model, version 
2.1, was used for this research. The service packs 2.1 and service pack 2.1 was also 




coastal flooding. However, user generated flood depth grid can also be used to estimate 
the potential damage and loss to buildings, essential facilities, bridges, vehicles, 
agricultural crops, etc. from that flood event. 
FEMA’s website http://www.fema.gov/hazus can be referred for information and 
assistance on Hazus-MH installation and/or any technical support.  (FEMA - Hazus) 
3.3.3 Hazus – MH Flood Model  
Figure 3.1 shows the process of using tool Hazus – MH Flood Model. It is quite simple 

























Figure 3.1 Process of Hazus – MH flood modeling. 









Hazus-MH Flood Model produces loss estimates which can be used by local, state 
and regional officials to assess the region’s vulnerability and to plan for flood risk 
mitigation measures, emergency preparedness, and response and recovery. The 
methodology includes only non-proprietary loss estimation methods. The software 
application is nonproprietary to the extent permitted by the ESRI (ArcGIS) related 
requirements. The Flood Model has widely been used by many state and local officials 
for risk assessment and mitigation planning e.g., for flood loss estimates and CRS flood 
mitigation planning in the city of Savannah, Georgia; to speed up disaster recovery from 
2008 Iowa flood, etc. 
Input Data:  
Basically there are two things which are needed to get the out-put and accurate 
calculations from the software. Those are as mentioned below.  
 Inventory 
 Flood Depth Grid 
Damage Estimation Methodology: 
The methodology incorporates available state-of-the-art models in the flood loss 
estimation methodology. For example, users can develop their depth grids based on their 
hydrologic and hydraulic models and use the most current depth damage functions. Flood 
hazard analysis and flood loss estimation analysis are the two basic analytical processes 
which builds the flood loss estimation methodology. The flood frequency, discharge, and 
ground elevation are some of the hazard characteristics which are used to estimate flood 
depth, flood elevation, and flow velocity. The physical damage and economic loss are 




steps. For example, the direct physical damage for the GBS is estimated in percent and is 
weighted by the area of inundation at a given depth for a given census block. It is 
assumed that the entire composition of the GBS within a given census block is evenly 
distributed throughout the block. 
Uncertainties in Loss Estimation 
Like any other loss estimation methodology, uncertainties do exist in this 
methodology as well. Thus the loss estimation should be used with a certain degree of 
caution. Uncertainties can result from the following: 
 Approximation and simplification necessary to conduct a specific study 
 Incomplete or inaccurate inventories, demographic or economic data.  
 Lack of in-depth scientific knowledge concerning floods and their effects upon 
buildings and facilities 
 
 User input can also have a great effect on the uncertainty associated with the 
results. 
 
Due to the above mentioned factors, the calculated hazard exposure and the loss 
estimations are approximate and do not predict results with 100% accuracy. However, it 
does allow users to identify and manage the flood hazard, risk, losses and in response and 
mitigation planning. The quality of the analysis and results improve with more complete 
data. 
Limitations of using Hazus-MH 
There are certain limitations in using Hazus-MH flood module and those were 
taken into consideration while using this tool. Following are some of the limitations 
encountered during the research: 
 It was learned that the study region must be completely contained by the DEM data 




study region, HAZUS does not allow it to be used for the hydrologic analysis. To 
avoid this limitation, DEM for the study region was defined by using the default 
option of accessing USGS website, as available in the Flood Model. 
 
 The current version of the Flood Model does not calculate the damage and loss for 
Hazardous Materials sites. 
 
 The Flood Model does not perform any direct analysis in support of casualty 





DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter deals with the process of data analysis and outcome of the data analysis. The 
data analysis was a step wise process as described in the Chapter 3. The detail analysis of 
the thesis is described in the chapter. 
 
4.1 Impact of Dam Breach and Sandy – Combined Event 
There are three event scenarios considered as described earlier, Dam breach on sunny 
day, a storm event only and a combined event. As described by the FMERC team Figure 
4.1 shows the inundation in each case. The combined event is calculated as a dam breach 
occuring 3 hours after storm event. The calculations are based upon number of cells of 
5m X 5m each. The whole area is sub-divided and estimated by the cells. There are lots 
of additional flooded cells in the combined event as compare to only the Sandy case. 
Figure 4.1 shows the comparison of all events. The Appendix A to C shows the detail 
maps of each case. 




There are lots of densly populated areas which were not flooded in the dam 
breach only analysis but were flooded in combined event. Table 4.1 shows the additional 
flooded cells and detailed comparison with other scenarios. The result is based on 
analysis of 5m X 5m cells. Figure 4.2 shows the common area under flooding due to both 
the events.  
Figure 4.2 Common area under flooding from both the events. 




Table 4.1 Comparison of Flood Inundation in Various Scenarios 








Open Water 1934 116003 90910 -21.6 
Developed / Open Spaces 26367 106838 126705 18.6 
Developed / Low Intensity 23663 266432 292325 9.7 
Developed / Medium 
Intensity 
25179 563132 607019 7.8 
Developed / High Intensity 18629 648528 687942 6.1 
Barren Land 104 6033 6103 1.2 
Deciduous Forest 982 6213 7007 12.8 
Evergreen Forest 3 262 262 0.0 
Shrub 428 5390 5427 0.7 
Grass Land / Herbaceuous 283 3606 3663 1.6 
Hay / Pasture 0 6277 6312 0.6 
Cultivated Crops 484 872 1390 59.4 
Woody Wetlands 29678 234092 255309 9.1 
Wetlands 2384 32482 32935 1.4 
Total 130118 1996160 2123309  
   
Table 4.1 clearly shows that due to the combined event percentage increase in 
developed areas are quite significant. The table just shows the additional cells flooded 
and not those cells which already have flood water and they got some additional flooding. 
The scenario is quite alarming. There is also a need to look at the combined event. There 
is a need to look at the only dam breach scenario and how arc wall is protecting against 
the dam breach. As the Arc wall is a best proposal according to FMERC team, the 
solution is rechecked for its considerability. For consideration of the process, even if 50 
percent economical damage is taking place compare to Sandy Table 4.2 gives an idea 
about the importance of the dam breach event. The base data is considered from the 





Table 4.2 Building Related Economic Loss Estimates – Arc Wall 
 
Figure 4.3 Percentage damage compare to Sandy. 
 
 
Category Area Residential CommercialIndustrial Others Total
(a) Building 5.735 14.195 9.81 1.34 31.08
(b) Content 4.26 40.555 19.34 7.085 71.24
(c) Inventory 0 1.365 3.155 0.01 4.53
Subtotal 9.995 56.115 32.305 8.435 106.85
(d) Income 0.005 0.455 0.005 0.04 0.505
(e) Relocation 0.055 0.14 0.01 0.035 0.24
(f) Rental Income 0.025 0.095 0 0.01 0.13
(g) Wage 0.01 0.425 0.01 0.99 1.435
Subtotal 0.095 1.115 0.025 1.075 2.31
All Total 10.09 57.23 32.33 9.51 109.16
Impact of Sandy in the 6 municipalities  which will  be protected by Arc Wall






Table 4.3 shows about $109.16 million is at stake with only the event of dam 
breach. The cost and benefit ratio for Arc wall in the case is coming 1.013. It shows the 
significance of the dam breach event. For further explanation Figure 4.3 shows how 
proposed solution of Arc wall is saving the region.  
Figure 4.3 Protected area during dam breach by the Arc wall. 




Thus, it is established that the dam breach event combined with Sandy will be a 
big problem and the option proposed by the NJIT – FMERC team should be sufficient 
enough to cater the needs of combined event. 
 
4.2 Calculation of Peak Scenario Timing 
This section deals with the consideration of the peak event. There are millions of 
possibilities through which this combined event can take place. If the storm starts at time 
= t0 , there are millions of possibilities at which the second event can start. It can start 
together with the super storm or it can start hours before or after super storm. The 
condition is seen here in the thesis with two different angles. One angle is irespective of 
time the grid of 5m X 5m each cell at its peak (Micro Level), the other angle is Macro 
level scenerio in which a lot of cells are at peak at one point of time. Both the scenerios 
are discussed in detail below.  
4.2.1 Micro Level Scenario 
In this section Macro level scenario is been discussed. As discussed earlier, both the 
events can happen in millions of ways. Micro level scenario describes each cell wise peak 
without consideration of the time value. Each Cell will be at its peak during the time 
different frames. The maximum height Hmax is considered and calculations are based 
upon Hmax. 
 The data is available in the raster formats. From the Raster formats with the help 
of Arc GIS, data is converted in to point format via use of conversion tools. Figure 4.4 




information for each 5m X 5m grid. The layers of Sunny day dam failure and Super 
Storm Sandy were converted with the use of same methodology to point formats.  
 Figure 4.4 Conversion tool. 
 
At this point, both the separate layers are having values for each individual points. 
There are about 26685 data points found in the region. Each point is having and unique 
ID number. With the help of Grid tool, addition of heights is done. The peak region is 
delineated by consideration of following things.  
 Land Use  
 Population density 
 Maximum water elevation during Sandy (h1) 
 Maximum water elevation during dam breach (h2) 




Peak Volume of water in Region: 
∑ h1i X a1i + ∑ h2j X a2j 
                                                i                    j 
(4.1) 
Where: 
a1 = Area flooded during Sandy 
a2 = Area flooded during dam breach 
h1 = Maximum water elevation during Sandy  
h2 = Maximum water elevation during dam breach  




Figure 4.5 and figure 4.6 shows the maximum peak elevations due to Sunny day 
dam breach and only a super storm inundation Hmax. Figure 4.7 shows the actual outcome 
of the process and the area of concentration. Figure 4.7 is the outcome of adding two 
volumes of water at different point of times at cell by cell bases. 
Figure 4.6 Only Super Storm and the Arc wall. 






Figure 4.7 Delineation of peak region. 
Thus, the section provides the worst case scenario cell by cell bases which is 




the analysis one can identify the area and get the idea about worst case scenario at the 
local neighborhood or factory / critical infrastructure level.    
4.2.2 Macro Level Scenario 
For the process of identifying the Macro level scenario, some studies were performed as 
indicated herein. Here the major difference is the consideration of time as a factor. At all 
available 26000 points, the scenario will be different at a particular time. One grid might 
be at the peak height and another might not be at its peak. The flood passes by the region, 
so the criticality of the event will vary with the time and location. In this section an 
attempt is made to look at a regional level and check the estimated peak flood in the 
overall region during a particular point of time. According to data availability, the 
process is done with two different methods.  
Process - 1 
The first process is done with the available data set of 24 concentration points and the 
region surrounding the data points / concentration region. Figure 4.8 shows the 24 data 
concentration points. From the NJIT FMERC team studies, the simulation logs are 
available. From the simulation logs, flood height for a sunny day dam breach and Sandy 
was considered. At different time frames the values of the flood height will be different at 
above locations. For both the events, at one particular time, the flood height for all 24 
concentration points will be at its peak. Even though individual heights will not be at its 
peak but for overall region number of points will be near to its peak. Most points will be 
at or close to their peak heights during the time frame. That will be the worst timing for 




Figure 4.8 Locations of concentration points.  





For both the events individual calculation are done in a similar way as for the micro level 
analysis. The equation for analysis is shown below. 
 
For Max
t[∑ h1i X a1i + ∑ h2j X a2j]t 
                                                         i                    j 
(4.2) 
Where: 
a1 = Area flooded during Sandy 
a2 = Area flooded during dam breach 
h1 = Maximum water elevation during Sandy  
h2 = Maximum water elevation during dam breach 
 
Peak Time Calculation for Sandy 
 
Figure 4.9 Sandy inundation height Zw at 10 min time intervals. 
From the data analysis, it is confirmed that all the 24 points as a cumulative 
effect, comes at a peak volume after 5.33 hours of Sandy. If Sandy starts at time T = 00 
hours, than after T = 5.33 hours the surroundings of all 24 areas will be at its peak height 
cumulatively. For the estimation of the time, data analysis is performed with the help of 5 
point moving averages as well as the averages. Thus, at 5.33 hours after Sandy starts the 
height of water will as well as the volume of water in 5m X 5m grid will be at or near to 




Peak Time Calculation for Dam Breach 
From the data analysis, it is confirmed that all the 24 points as a cumulative 
effect, comes at a peak after 3.40 hours of dam breach. If dam breach starts at time T = 00 
hours, than after T = 3.40 hours the surroundings of all 24 areas will be at its peak height 
cumulatively. For the estimation of the time, data analysis is performed with the help of 5 
point moving averages as well as the averages. Thus, at 3.40 hours after Sandy starts the 
height of water will as well as the volume of water in 5m X 5m grid will be at its peak for 
all 24 points. Figure 4.10 shows the dam breach inundation height at 10 min interval. 
 
Figure 4.10 dam breach inundation height Zw at 10 min time intervals. 
 
Peak Time Calculation for Combined Event 
As mentioned earlier, the Sandy effect is at its peak at time T = 5.33 hours after 
Sandy starts. The Dam breach will be at its peak after time T = 3.40 hours. The worst 
case scenario for the region will be, if one considers a super storm like Sandy happens at 
time T = 0.00 hours, dam breaks at time T = 1.93 hours after 0.00 hours. If the dam 
breaks after 1hour 56 min when super storm starts will be the worst case scenario as both 
the events individually will be at its peak during the same time frame. The methodology 




limitations, an empirical method has been adopted. To get the precise result at the time 
frame, one needs to run the simulations during the exact time frame to see the Q results 
for the combined event. Figure 4.11 shows the combined heights for the combined event 
at peak time. Cumulative Flow (Qmax) is shown in appendix D. 
    
Figure 4.12 Combined Heights at Peak time for Combined Event. 
 
Process-2 
Due to the lack of data availability, it was not possible to get the outcome for the whole 
region in Process 1. It shows the result around the selected 24 points and region nearby. 
In process 2 an attempt is made to get the homogeneous out come for whole region. The 
base data available from the FMERC team at NJIT are raster formats with rasters of peak 
heights and rasters of flood arrival time. The flood arrival is also shown with the use of 
Google Earth Files (KML) files with time tags. It is difficult to get the time tag versus 
actual flood height in both the events. The available rasters for a dam breach on a sunny 




Figure 4.12 H max and flood arrival time for a dam breach. 
From the raster files, it is converted to point files, which was explained earlier in 
this respect. The height raster is easily converted but the time raster is in a different 
format and it was not possible to convert the same in to point files. Another process 
through which it is possible to get time and height factors is through KML files. The 
KML files have data at 10 minute time intervals. It is also not possible to get the direct 
inundation and flood elevation data from KML files. The time frame under consideration 
was peak time plus 50 minutes and peak time -20 minutes with compare to process - 1.  
From the KML files, output is shown in the Figure 4.13. From the KML files high 
resolution images were taken through the help of Google Earth Pro with a pixcel size of 
0.50M X 0.50M. The high resolution images are processed with the help of Adobe 
Photoshope – 6.0. With the use of command layer via cut and select by color, each 




then were transferred and overlaid to base maps. Then the process is converting image in 
to raster with the particular height value attached to the raster. The last step is to overlay 
rasters with the Hmax value and converting that raster in to point files. 
Figure 4.13 Sunny Day Dam Breach Inundation at Peak Time 
The outcome of the tedious process is the value of flood height (flood inundation) 
at a snap shot of time. The time and the height moment both are in the same layer. For 
both the scenarios, a dam breach one a sunny day and Sandy only the process is repeated 
to get the result. Cell by cell scenarios also show similar results as Process -1. The critical 
time for Sandy only with this process is time frame of 5.30 to 5.40 hours after T = 00 
(Sandy). The critical time frame for peak sunny day dam failure is 3.40 to 3.50 hours 
after T = 00 (Dam breach). Thus, the peak timing for both of the events is 1.80 hours to 
2.00 hours time frame after T = 00 hours (Sandy). The results are similar and quite 




4.3 Analyzing the Arc Wall 
The best possible solution proposed by FMERC team is the Arc wall, thus, in the section 
of the Arc wall is analyzed for the combined event worst case scenario. The height of the 
Arc wall is proposed as 12 feet in height. With the help of Arc-GIS, all the points in the 
combined event, are checked for the over topping factor. Flood indudation height and the 
height of the Arc wall is checked. The Figure 4.14 shows overtopping location for a sea 
level rise of 37.6 inches. There are 60 cells, which means 30 meter length of wall, 
overflows. Figure 4.15 shows the height comparison at the same point during different 
sea level rise. In case of sea level rise 37.6 inches the are wall is over topped by 0.3 feet.  
 Figure 4.14 Location of over topping during combined event 




Figure 4.15 – Height comparison at location of overtopping with different sea level rise. 
The possibility of a combined event with a sea level rise of 37.6 inches is very 
low but there are chances of overtopping during the event. The over topping is 0.3 ft. 
Thus, there is need to rethink the proposed height of the Arc-wall. There is a need to 
simulate during the time frame  just infront of the arc wall for the combined event to get 
the accurate result. 
 
4.4 Modifications to the Arc wall 
The FMERC report suggests that there are possible modifications to the Arc wall to make 
it more effective. By considering the factores of density, environmental sensitivity, land 
use pattern, direction of incoming flood, slight modifications are proposed by using Arc-
GIS. There are basic two options proposed. There is a need to extend the Arc wall by 150 
feet in the North direction. The inflow of water during dam breach is coming from the 
north of the Arc wall. Thus, the realignment will save the six municipalities from 
flooding due to a dam breach. There are environmental factors also considered for e.g., 






4.4.1 Option 1 
Option 1 is proposed by considering the direction of flood coming to the region and by 
considering the geometry of the bay. Here there is an attempt made to extednd the wall 
by about 15o feet in the North direction, due to the incoming flow of water during the 
dam breach. The geographic pattern of the land is followed for the Southern portion to 
aviod damages to the marine eco-system. Figure 4.16 shows the option 1 in compare to 
the original proposal. The length of the arc wall is almost doubled to 8.78 miles in length 
in this case. 




4.4.2 Option 2 
Option 2 is proposed by considering the direction of flood coming to the region and the 
dense population areas near the Arc wall. There is an attempt made to extednd the wall 
by about 150 feets in the north direction, to aviod the incoming flow of water during a 
dam breach. Nearby dense areas are also incorporated within the wall. Figure 4.17 shows 
the option 2 in compare to the original proposal. The length of the arc wall is almost to 


































4.5 Damage Assessment 
This section describes the process that was implemented in setting up the study region, 
installation and execution of Hazus-MH flood module and assessment of the Sandy flood 
damage for the study area. 
Setting up of the study region begins with identification of the study area. Since 
the basic inventory of Hazus is stored at the census block level, the study area can be as 
small as a specific census block or it can be built at census tract, County or State level. 
The study region can also be built based on the Watershed. 
Building the region based on census tract needs further validation as there is 
direct mapping between the municipality boundaries and census tract ids. For example, 
 Moonachie municipality can be mapped to Census Tract Id 34003036200 and Little 
Ferry can be mapped to Census Tract 34003029200 and 34003029100. However, Census 
tract 34003036200 is used by both Moonachie as well as South Hackensack. 





Figure 4.17 shows the overlapping of census tract and municipality boundaries. 
To avoid this issue, the study region for this research was built at the census block level. 
There are a total of 158 census blocks covering the Little Ferry and Moonachie 
municipalities. After creating the study region, the flood hazard type needs to be defined 
as “Riverine only”, “Coastal only” or “Riverine and coastal”. Since this study region 
contains no coastal shoreline, coastal hazard is not applicable and hence the hazard was 
chosen as riverine only. 
Defining the topography is the most critical step in flood hazard analysis. Hazus 
Flood Model identifies the data extent of digital elevation based on the defined study 
region. The DEM was then downloaded to the local drive, from the USGS website, by 
directly navigating to NED using the option provided by the Flood Model. The 
downloaded data was then imported into the Flood Model by browsing to the local drive. 
This downloaded data from the USGS web site uses the NAVD88 vertical datum and a 
resolution of one arc-second (approximately 30 meters). 
User has the option to either use the coordinates generated by the Flood Model 
and get the data from the USGS website or add one’s own DEM layer that satisfies the 
requirement. 
The process of building the Hazus-MH compatible flood depth grid started with 
combining both the Sandy and Dam breach events at critical time. The Flood indundation 
data is already in the point format. The files are converted to rasters and rasters are 
overlayed on each other via raster overlay tool in Arc-GIS. The used defined flood depth 





4.5.1 Damage Estimation by Hazus-MH 
Hazus-MH Flood Model analyzes the different characteristics of the structures and 
people of the study region to the flood which have been calculated in the scenario based 
on the given flood depth grid. Various damage functions are used by the model to assess 
the damage and dollar exposure. Flood damage functions are in the form of depth damage 
curves, relating depth of flooding (in feet), as measured from the top of the first finished 
floor, to damage expressed as a percent of replacement cost (FEMA 2010). For example, 
the default damage function estimates percent damage relative to the depth of floodwater 
as measured from the top of the first finished floor for riverine flood hazard. 
To assess the damage, Analysis should be run from the “Run” submenu under 
“Analysis” menu. Analysis on General Building Stock needs to be performed before 
executing the damage assessment analysis on any other category e.g., Transportation 
System, Utility System, etc. Once the Analysis process runs, the results or damage 
estimates can be viewed from the “Results” menu.  
 
4.6 Benefit Cost Analysis 
This section describes the financial model and the process of executing benefit cost 
analysis to evaluate modifications of the originally proposed Arc Wall. This can be one 
of the inputs for the decision makers when there are multiple mitigation alternatives 
available but not all of those or the one resulting most benefit can be chosen due to 
limited funds. 
The Arc wall in general is targeted at protecting the municipality of Moonachie, 




expected to provide complete protection from tidal surges like what was experienced 
during Sandy. These Barrier Walls will not provide relief from local riverine flooding 
within the target communities of Moonachie, Little Ferry, and Hackensack. 
4.6.1 Cost Assumptions 
Based on the quantity take-off for each alternative, the following categories of cost 
components were identified and used in the cost-benefit analysis: 
Initial Capital Cost is the cost required to construct or build the protection 
measures. The conceptual capital cost estimation includes high level estimation of the 
following items: 
 Design and Approval 
 Mobilization 
 Clearing and Grubbing 
 Construction of Access Roads 
 Construction of Drainage Ditches 
 Cost of Raising the roads 
 Relocation of Utilities 
 Procurement of the Real Estate and Easements 
 Mitigation of Wetland 
 Installing 40’ Long Sheet Piles.  
 Navigable water crossing 
 Movable gates on road and railroad 
 Tide Gates wherever the walls are crossing a water stream 




 Overhead and Profit 
 
Annual Maintenance and Repair cost includes the cost of following items: 
 Operating the tide gates 
 Operating the movable gates on road or railroad 
 Operation of the Pump Station 
 Maintenance of all components of the solution e.g., Tide Gates, Movable Gates, 
Pump Station, Ditches, etc. 
 
Periodic Maintenance Cost includes any other cost required to invest 
periodically to maintain the serviceability of the alternatives. For example, the pump 
station might have to be replaced after a certain period of time. For this analysis, it’s 
assumed that 50% of the pumps or other mechanical equipment will need to be replaced 
after every 20 years of operations. 
Estimated Life Span is the total estimated life span for each alternative is 
assumed to be 70 years. It is assumed that at the end of 70 years, nonmechanical portions 
of each alternative will have a remaining residual value 
Remaining Residual Value is the value of the alternative option at the end of its 
proposed life span. This is assumed to be at 20% of the initial capital costs minus all 
mechanical costs associated with pumping stations. 
4.6.2 Benefit Assessment and Assumptions 
Benefits are considered to be the positive impacts which will be created by the alternative 
structural solutions which will help protect the targeted communities from a future Sandy 




solution is two-fold. First, Sandy damage which will be eliminated or mitigated to a great 
extent once the selected solution is built. Thus the benefit is almost a direct translation of 
the loss/cost incurred due to the damage caused by Sandy. Second, the induced benefits 
due to wage content and the multiplier effect from recycling wages through the supplier 
chain.  
Using the simulated Sandy inundation flood depth grid, various flood scenarios 
were executed and losses from Sandy were estimated for each set of communities which 
are being protected by various structural alternatives. For the purpose of analysis, 
building related economic losses for Sandy is considered the same as consiederd by the 
FMERC team at NJIT. Table 4.3 shows estimated building related losses due to dam 
breach and Table 4.4 shows the  building related losses in the combined event scenario.  
 





Table 4.4 Building Related Economic Losses – Combined Event 
 
The benefit and cost ratio is calculated for all the events described earlier. A life 
cycle cost benefit analysis was performed for each of the structural alternatives. The Net 
Present value (NPV) of Costs of each Alternative is the denominator of the Benefit-Cost 
Ratio. The numerator represents the benefits derived from a given protection alternative, 
which integrates the removal of damage and economic losses from protected 
communities, as well as the induced benefits from large-scale infrastructure projects.  
Table 4.5 provides the benefit-cost ratio for the various structural alternatives. 
The ratio is calculated for two different scenarios – (1) assuming there will be just one 
Sandy like event during the 70 year time horizon (2) there will be two such events in the 




Table 4.4 – Building Related Economic Losses – Sandy 

















Only Sandy 262.68 218.32 157.61 1.43 2.26 
Only Dam Breach 262.68 92.78 157.61 0.95 1.31 
Combined Event 262.68 301.19 157.61 1.75 2.89 
Incresed Ht 0.3 ft 269.25 301.19 161.55 1.72 2.84 
Option - 1 411.22 329.71 246.74 1.40 2.20 
Option - 2 293.67 315.34 176.2 1.67 2.75 
 
In the event when there is one disaster in 70 years of life span, the Arc Wall for 
combined event is the most justifiable. However, even for only dam breach in two case 
scenerio are wall is soly justified. Thus the Arc wall is proven justified option in case of 
combined as well as independent events of dam breach and thunder storm. Benefit-Cost 
ratio can be an input to decision makers while choosing the feasible solution given the 



















As a result of a wide-reaching comprehensive post-Sandy NJIT project entitled "Flood 
Mitigation Engineering Resource Center (FMERC)" and sponsored by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and the Governor’s Office for Reconstruction 
and Recovery, a detailed investigation of alternative measures for flood mitigation in the 
Meadowlands area was completed in June 2014. The project involved the assessment of 
flood impacts, and the evaluation of a range of structural and non-structural capital 
improvement measures, maintenance, operations and regulatory measures, and broad 
system design and redundancy measures. 
 The basic objective of this thesis was to develop an innovative procedure for the 
enumeration and simulation of probability-weighted combined events, e.g., Oradell dam 
failure under various scenarios (sunny day, water level, etc.) along with a super storm 
event at various time staging levels. The approach broadens the analytical arsenal 
available to policy-makers for the purpose of comprehensive risk and resiliency analysis 
and the selection of optimal protection alternatives. 
The methodology includes data analysis done with the help of software like Arc 
GIS and Hec-Ras / Hec-Geo-HMS. Using GIS simulations, the FMERC proposed 
solutions e.g., Arc Wall are simulated under combined event scenarios in order to identify 
possible modifications or adjustments for maximum risk reduction. According to the 
FMERC report there is a land area in the Meadowlands of about 1773.9 acres, which is 
not flooded by Sandy alone, but would be flooded due to the combined event under a 




scenarios, a new approach was derived to identify relative timings at which the combined 
event is at its peak. Accordingly, adapted strategies which are modifications to the latest 
FMERC structural solutions are proposed in order to provide cost-effective protection 
and risk management in the combined event. The incremental benefit-cost ratio 
associated with these adapted strategies was also calculated in this report, as risk 
reduction levels (benefits) are compared to the costs of modified alternatives. 
An outcome of this research is the development of an empirical approach for 
simulating combined events and identifying the least desirable relative timing of the two 
flood events. Consequently, the robustness and risk reduction of various protection 
investments under consideration can be assessed for combined flooding event scenarios, 
and adaptation strategies derived to provide a more comprehensive level of protection. 
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